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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, MAR ROXAS and MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., Petitioners,
- versus -
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines , Respondents. x------------------------------------------x
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
- versus -
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent. x------------------------------------------x
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, - versus -
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents. x------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent. x-----------------------------------------x
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. x------------------------------------------x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, - versus - HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 169777
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
July 14, 20006
G.R. No. 169659
G.R. No. 169660
G.R. No. 169667
G.R. No. 169834
G.R. No. 171246
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RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Pending consideration are 1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 18, 2006 filed by respondents, praying that the Decision promulgated on April 20, 2006 (the Decision) be set aside, and 2) the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 17, 2006 filed by petitioner PDP-Laban in so far as the Decision held that it was without the requisite standing to file the petition in G.R. No. 169834.
Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Francisco I. Chavez, and PDP-Laban filed their respective Comments to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
Respecting PDP-Laban's Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al. and petitioner Chavez endorse the same. Respondents, however, pray for its denial.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents argue that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation has not been published, hence, the President may properly prohibit the appearance of executive officials before Congress.
Even assuming arguendo that the said Rules of Procedure had not been published, such does not have any bearing on the validity of any of the provisions of E.O. 464. The prohibition under Section 1 of E.O. 464 has to do with the question hour, not with inquiries in aid of legislation. As to the prohibition authorized by Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b), the basis thereof is executive privilege, not the purported failure to publish rules of procedure.
If the President would prohibit executive officials from appearing before Congress on the ground of lack of published rules of procedure, such would not be an exercise of executive privilege, but simply a claim to protection under the due process clause - a right which the President has in common with any other citizen. The claim to such protection is not based on the confidential nature of the information held by the official concerned, as in the case of executive privilege, but on the defective nature of the legislative inquiry itself. The prohibition under Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is based solely on executive privilege, not on any alleged defect in the inquiry arising from a lack of published rules of procedure.
Respondents go on to argue that the President's invocation of executive privilege is "for practical purposes," in that since the President would be in no position to raise an objection the moment a question is asked by Congress, she must be allowed to prohibit the appearance of the official concerned, at least until she is able to thoroughly discuss the matter with the said official. For, so respondents contend, "once the information has been coerced out of the official, there is no turning back, and the damage that could result might be devastating to the functioning of government." [1] cralaw
The tentative prevention of an official from appearing before Congress pending discussion of the matter on inquiry with the President cannot, however, be properly deemed an exercise of executive privilege, not even one "for practical purposes." Any such discussion is meant precisely to allow the President to determine whether the information sought falls under the privilege. Before such determination, the claim of privilege could only be based on mere speculation that the information sought might be confidential in nature. Certainly, Congress cannot be bound by such a tenuous invocation of the privilege.
The executive branch, nonetheless, need not be apprehensive that it might not be able to invoke executive privilege in time to prevent disclosures of legitimately confidential information. As this Court stated in the Decision, the President and the Executive Secretary must be given fair opportunity to determine whether the matter under legislative investigation calls for a claim of privilege. [2] cralaw To secure this fair opportunity, the executive branch need not resort to a precautionary claim of privilege like that proffered by respondents. The President may, instead, direct the official concerned to ask Congress for reasonable time to discuss with her the subject matter of the investigation.
Section 3 in relation to 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is far from being a mere directive to officials summoned by Congress to ask for time to confer with the President. It is an authorization for implied claims of privilege. [3] cralaw As such, the criteria for evaluating its validity must be those for claims of executive privilege. On the basis of such criteria, the Court found the implied claim authorized under Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 to be defective.
In fine, no argument in respondents' Motion for Reconsideration merits a reversal or modification of the Decision.
As for its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner PDP-Laban avers that there is no fundamental difference between it and petitioner Bayan Muna to justify their unequal treatment since both of them have members in Congress. It claims, moreover, that all its members are taxpayers and Filipino citizens whose right to information was, as held in the Decision, violated by E.O. 464.
There are, however, fundamental distinctions between PDP-Laban and Bayan Muna which call for this Court's contrasting rulings with regard to their standing.
While both parties have members in Congress, PDP-Laban, unlike Bayan Muna , is not represented therein as a party-list organization. The PDP-Laban members in Congress were elected to represent, not their party, but their constituents, i.e., their legislative district in the case of representatives, or the nation at large in the case of senators. The Bayan Muna members in Congress, on the other hand, were elected precisely to represent their party. [4] cralaw In fact, in light of the party-list system, the representatives from Bayan Muna may be said to have been elected only indirectly, since it was Bayan Muna itself, as a party, which was voted for in the last elections where it received enough votes to entitle it to three seats in the House of Representatives. [5] cralaw This, again, contrasts with the situation of the PDP-Laban members in Congress who were all elected in their individual capacities.
Indeed, the rights of the Bayan Muna representatives are so intertwined with their party's right to representation in Congress that, in the event they change their party affiliation during their term of office, they would have to forfeit their seat [6] cralaw - a rule which clearly does not apply to the PDP-Laban members in Congress.
Bayan Muna is thus entitled to participate in the legislative process in a way that cannot be said of PDP-Laban.
With regard to PDP-Laban's assertion that it consists of taxpayers and Filipino citizens, suffice it to state that its Petition did not assert this as a ground for its standing to sue. It merely alleged that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda and that the issues involved are of transcendental importance, [7] cralaw which points were already addressed in the Decision.
If PDP-Laban intended to sue as an organization of citizens in pursuit of the right to information of such citizens, it did not so state in its petition. As such, the Court could not be satisfied that its participation in the controversy would ensure "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." [8] cralaw
A final point. Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., by Manifestation dated
WHEREFORE
, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of
Respondents dated
SO ORDERED.
���������������������������� CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
��������� Associate Justice��
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
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REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES- strong>SANTIAGO Associate Justice
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIAAssociate Justice
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
��������� Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
����������������������������������������������� ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
����������������������������������������������� Chief Justice
Endnotes:
* ����� On Official Leave.
[1] cralaw Rollo , p. 549.
[2] cralaw ����� Decision, p. 47.
[3] cralaw Vide Decision, p. 39.
[4] cralaw Section 10 of The Party-List System Act (R.A. 7941) states: "Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes. The first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives x x x (Underscoring supplied)
[5] cralaw Section 11 (b) of R.A. 7941 states: "The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes case for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats." (Underscoring supplied)
[6] cralaw Section 13 of R.A. 7941 states: "Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization."
[7] cralaw Rollo , pp. 4-5.
[8] cralaw Kilosbayan v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 696 (1995).
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